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As Professor Edwards discussed in his article, the rise in arbitration
agreements has essentially closed the door for courts to gradually find that
financial advisors have fiduciary duties to their clients. As a result,
consumers—and the attorneys advocating on their behalf—must rely on
the legislature to establish these fiduciary duties. Accordingly, I will briefly
discuss the rise in mandatory arbitration in advisor agreements; how
Tennessee specifically has responded to arbitration in financial services
agreements; why Tennessee and other state legislatures should act to
protect consumer interests; and how Congress has responded to the rise
in mandatory arbitration provisions.
Mandatory arbitration clauses permeate nearly every major financial
service agreement. 1 Although arbitration can be incredibly helpful for
sophisticated parties to resolve disputes more efficiently and economically,
forced arbitration clauses usually are a detriment to the consumer. 2 Indeed,
mandatory arbitration provisions eliminate a consumer’s right to process. 3
Specifically, mandatory arbitration agreements from financial services
firms are often presented “on a take-it-or-leave-it basis.” 4 As a result,
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Clause, THE KANSAS CITY STAR (May 16, 2019, 3:02 PM), https://www.kansascity.com
/news/business/personal-finance/article230488094.html.
2 Jeff Brown, Why Your Financial Service Agreement Includes Arbitration, U.S. NEWS: MONEY
(Mar. 27, 2017, 10:13 AM), https://money.usnews.com/investing/articles/2017-03-27/
why-your-financial-service-agreement-includes-arbitration.
3 Meredith R. Miller, Contracting Out of Process, Contracting Out of Corporate Accountability:
An Argument Against Enforcement of Pre-Dispute Limits on Process, 75 TENN. L. REV. 365, 367
(2008) (“[C]orporations us[e] the pre-dispute arbitration regime to contract around
process in an attempt to insulate themselves from any potential responsibility they might
otherwise take on by virtue of their contractual relationships with stakeholder
constituencies.”).
4 Id. at 373; see also Brown, supra note 2.
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consumers must decide whether to agree to mandatory arbitration or
forgo financial services. Moreover, consumers are often ignorant to the
implications of signing these documents because mandatory arbitration
clauses may include waivers to punitive or consequential damages. 5 These
agreements also increasingly waive the consumer’s right to join a classaction lawsuit. 6 While theoretically consumers could find a financial
services provider that does not require mandatory arbitration, these
provisions have become so popular as to render that possibility extinct. 7
As a result, consumers are left with only suboptimal choices: either agree
to mandatory arbitration or forgo financial advice all together. 8
Accordingly, whenever disputes arise with their financial advisors—such a
breach of fiduciary duty—consumers find themselves with limited
recourse due to arbitration and waiver issues.
Although mandatory arbitration agreements eliminate consumers’
access to the courts, arbitration is an excellent alternative to judicial
proceedings for financial advising firms. Indeed, “[f]inancial services firms
prefer arbitration because it limits their costs and exposure and resolves
the dispute quickly and confidentially through individuals with industry
knowledge and expertise.” 9 Indeed, arbitration allows companies to better
control the costs of dispute resolution, and the process is less publicized
than litigation. Furthermore, arbitration agreements are grounded in
contract law; 10 as a result, arbitration agreements are given significant
leeway under the freedom of contract principle. In fact, some believe that
mandatory arbitration clauses “have been elevated to the status of ‘super
contract’ because of their ‘near-automatic enforcement by means of
specific performance.’” 11 Consequently, the drafter of an arbitration
agreement (typically, the financial services firm) may rely on contract law
to enforce the provisions of the agreement. Accordingly, financial advising
firms benefit significantly from mandatory arbitration and have a
significant interest in maintaining their validity.

5 See Miller, supra note 3, at 373 (“[C]orporations have also attempted to use form
arbitration clauses to exact limits on the other party’s procedural rights.”).
6 See id.
7 Id.
8 See id.
9 Brown, supra note 2.
10 Miller, supra note 3, at 366.
11 Id. at 367.
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Tennessee traditionally supports arbitration judicially and
legislatively. 12 Consequently, it is unsurprising that there is little caselaw on
the validity of mandatory arbitration clauses. In fact, the Tennessee
Uniform Arbitration Act (the “TUAA”), enacted in 1983, greatly
resembles the Uniform Arbitration Act. 13 Under the TUAA, the legislature
provides arbitration substantial leeway to adjudicate disputes outside the
court system. 14 Neither Tennessee case law nor legislation indicates that
the state is worried about the effects of mandatory arbitration agreements
on consumers in financial services agreements.
As a general rule, Tennessee courts give arbitration agreements as
“broad a construction as the words . . . will allow.” 15 Indeed, in the leading
case Arnold v. Morgan Keegan & Co., where a consumer entered into a
financial services agreement that included forced arbitration, the
Tennessee Supreme Court noted that “[i]t is well established that courts
should play only a limited role in reviewing the decisions of arbitrators.” 16
Specifically, a court should confirm an arbitrator’s decision “[a]s long as
the arbitrator is, arguably, construing or applying the contract and acting
within the scope of his authority[.]” 17 Even if the court believes the
arbitrator has made a “serious error,” the court should nevertheless
confirm the arbitrator’s decision. 18 Accordingly, not only are Tennessee
courts largely unconcerned about the validity of mandatory arbitration
agreements, but the courts are highly deferential to the arbitrator’s
decision. Thus, consumers in Tennessee should expect to perform
mandatory arbitration provisions in financial services agreements; they
should also expect for the arbitrator’s decision to be final, regardless of
the court’s opinion on the circumstances.

12 See Buraczynski v. Eyring, 919 S.W.2d 314, 317 (Tenn. 1996); see also TENN. CODE
ANN. § 29-5-303 (2018). But see generally Wofford v. M.J. Edwards & Sons Funeral Home,
Inc., 490 S.W.3d 800 (Tenn. Ct. App. 2015) (holding that where a company forced
arbitration by reference to a document that was not provided to the customer, the
mandatory arbitration provision was unconscionable and unenforceable).
13 Steven W. Feldman, Vacatur of Awards Under the Tennessee Uniform Arbitration Act:
Substance, Procedure, and Strategies for Practitioners, 26 U. MEM. L. REV. 271, 273 (2016).
14 See Uniform Arbitration Act, TENN. CODE ANN. §§ 29-5-301–20 (2018).
15 Feldman, supra note 13 (quoting Urology Assocs. v. CIGNA Healthcare of Tenn., No.
M2001-02252-COA-R3-CV, 2002 WL 31302922, at *5 (Tenn. Ct. App. Feb. 18, 2003).
16 914 S.W.2d 445, 448 (Tenn. 1996) (citing United Paperworkers Int’l Union, AFLCIO v. Misco, Inc., 484 U.S. 29, 36 (1987)).
17 Id. at 449.
18 Id.
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Tennessee courts have found that no arbitration agreement exists,
however, whenever a consumer receives no notice of a mandatory
arbitration provision until after the purchase is complete. 19 Nevertheless,
the courts and legislature have been relatively quiet on financial advising
agreements specifically. In Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe, the Tennessee
Supreme Court again did not question the validity of an advising
agreement’s mandatory arbitration clause; however, the court addressed
the reviewability of a trial court’s order to either vacate or confirm an
arbitration award. 20 Specifically, the court held that appellate courts have
subject matter jurisdiction over a trial court order “that vacates an
arbitration award and orders a second arbitration.” 21 Although this
decision says nothing about the enforceability of mandatory arbitration
clauses, the court’s decision in Smythe illustrates that the Tennessee
Supreme Court is shying away from the extensive deference provided to
arbitrators in Arnold.
Indeed, Tennessee, along with many other states across the country,
has done little to protect consumer interests against mandatory arbitration
provisions. While we wait and see if the courts will step back into the arena
for resolving advisor contract disputes, the state and federal legislatures
must step up to protect consumer interests. As Professor Edwards
suggests in his article, one avenue to protect consumer interests is to
formally place fiduciary duties on financial advisors. Another choice,
however, would be to eliminate mandatory arbitration provisions in
financial advising agreements. For example, Virginia banned mandatory
arbitration clauses in investment client contracts through a new state rule.
Specifically, the state reasoned that mandatory arbitration clauses are
“totally contrary to the fiduciary duty of an investment advisor to take
away a right someone has to pursue the forum of their choice if they have
a disagreement with an investment adviser.” 22 While investment brokers
are typically the focus for mandatory arbitration clauses, banning these
Capps v. Adams Wholesale Co., No. E2014-01882-COA-R3-CV, 2015 WL 2445970, at
*3 (Tenn. Ct. App. May 21, 2015) (holding that “there was never an objective mutual
assent to the terms of the agreement when Plaintiffs were not notified that such an
agreement existed.”).
20 Morgan Keegan & Co. v. Smythe, 401 S.W. 595, 603 (Tenn. 2013).
21 Id. at 612.
22 Mark Schoeff Jr., Virginia Poised to Ban Mandatory Arbitration Clauses for StateRegistered Advisers, INV. NEWS (Sept. 9, 2019, 2:30 PM), https://www.investmentnews.com
/article/20190909/FREE/190909948/virginia-poised-to-ban-mandatory-arbitrationclauses-for-state.
19
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provisions against advisors certainly takes a step in the right direction.
Indeed, Virginia is the first state to ban mandatory arbitration for financial
advisors. 23 The new rule, which went into effect on September 16,
illustrates the emerging awareness for protecting consumer interests. If
more states followed in Virginia’s footsteps to limit forced arbitration
clauses in financial service agreements, then consumers could finally have
their days in court to adjudicate their disputes. This would also allow
judges to establish precedent that favored consumers’ interest.
The federal government has also begun to take notice of the
detrimental effects of mandatory arbitration clauses. Specifically, the U.S.
House of Representatives recently passed a bill that, if passed, would have
banned mandatory arbitration clauses in advisor contracts. 24 The Forced
Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act 25—the FAIR Act, for short—was passed
by the House on Friday, September 20, 2019 and was sent to the Senate
the following Tuesday. 26 Coined a “sweeping” bill of legislation, the FAIR
Act would have banned any future mandatory arbitration clauses and
retroactively nullified all existing clauses in advisor contracts. 27 Under this
bill, firms could still offer arbitration to its investors whenever disputes
arise, but financial advisors could no longer force consumers to agree to
mandatory arbitration at the outset of their relationship. 28 Representative
Jim Jordan proposed an amendment to the bill to eliminate the safe-harbor
provision, and the bill ultimately died in Senate committee.29 Nevertheless,
the FAIR Act serves as a glimmering hope for consumer advocates.30
Specifically, the bill itself illustrates that Congress is beginning to take a
critical look at mandatory arbitration clauses on both sides of the aisle.31
Thus, it is hopeful that in the future we will see bipartisan legislation aimed
at protecting consumers from mandatory arbitration clauses.

Id.
Tracey Longo, Bill Ending Mandatory Arbitration In Advisor, Broker Contracts Clears
House, FIN. ADVISOR (Sept. 23, 2019), https://www.fa-mag.com/news/bill-endingmandatory-arbitration-in-advisor--broker-contracts-clears-house-51805.html
25 Forced Arbitration Injustice Repeal Act, H.R. 1423, 116th Cong. (2019).
26 165 CONG. REC. H7, 848–49 (daily ed. Sept. 20, 2019) (voting record of House
of Representatives).
27 Longo, supra note 24.
28 Id.
29 Id.
30 Id.
31 See id.
32 Longo, supra note 24.
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Financial advising firms have a serious interest in protecting
mandatory arbitration agreements. Thus, it is no surprise that the financial
industry lobbies heavily to protect mandatory arbitration clauses.32
Nevertheless, consumer protection is more important now than ever as
retirees rely more and more on investments and personal savings.33 Thus,
protecting investors’ interests from the consistently disappointing results
of mandatory arbitration, and holding advising firms accountable, is a
pressing legal issue that needs a resolution. Nevertheless, the prominence
of mandatory arbitration has taken the issue outside of the courthouse
doors. Accordingly, it is time that the issue be addressed through the ballot
box—our elected officials, the state, and federal legislatures. While the
FAIR Act indicates that protecting consumer interests is on Congress’s
radar, state legislatures are already empowered to protect consumer
interests—and should take action—by limiting the validity of mandatory
arbitration provisions in financial services agreements.

